A Prosperity-First Approach

Back in 2001, expectations in Latin America soared when the newly elected George W. Bush promised to turn the 2000s into the "Century of the Americas." The Sept. 11 attacks and their aftermath, however, quickly dashed any hope for integration and shared prosperity, and instead ushered in an era of mutual disappointment and recrimination.

Fast-forward to the beginning of 2009. A renewed sense of hope followed President Obama’s promise of a "new chapter" in U.S.-Latin American relations based on mutual respect and partnership. But in the wake of the June 28 coup in Honduras, the U.S.'s efforts to restore democratic order there made a mockery of democracy, according to some Latin-American officials.

"The romance with Obama’s foreign policy is over," said one Latin-American diplomat, speaking on condition of anonymity. Last month, The New York Times quoted Marco Aurelio Garcia, a senior adviser to Brazilian president Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva, who echoed the sentiment: "The truth is," Garcia said, "so far we have a strong sense of disappointment."

Carmen Lomellin, the U.S.'s new permanent representative to the Organization of American States, took umbrage at such negative reactions to the resolution of the Honduran crisis. At an OAS Permanent Council meeting on Dec. 4, she denounced "the acrimony, backward looking, accusatory tones and inaccurate historical accounts" of some of her counterparts.

The disenchantment is mutual and, for some, it marks a return to the historically divisive relations between the U.S. and its southern neighbors. From a certain angle, history appears to be repeating itself: first as tragedy, as Karl Marx quipped, then as farce.

But is it really?

During the Bush years, the chasm that grew between the U.S. and Latin America was a product of Bush’s security-first doctrine. Many Latin-American nations had declared the events of Sept. 11 not merely an attack on the United States, but an attack on all. But by the time the Iraq war began, nearly four out of five countries in the region opted out of the U.S.-led "coalition of the willing."

For most of the region, the reasons were simple: Although the threats to Latin America’s own security were grave, and confronting them would likely require international cooperation, Saddam Hussein – thousands of miles away from their poor and disillusioned populations – had very little to do with those threats. Over time, the rift between the nations who were "with us" and "against us" grew ever more pronounced.

Some say it is the same today. Latin America’s security concerns still revolve around internal issues such as the destabilizing forces of organized crime and gangs. Meanwhile, Washington’s security priorities remain elsewhere, they argue, as evidenced by Obama’s Dec. 1 speech on Afghanistan.

However, Washington’s new security policy makes important distinctions. It matters little to Obama whether Latin America supports the U.S. effort in Afghanistan – he doesn’t view it as a litmus test of loyalty to the United States.

More critically, Obama is seeking to refocus and narrow the military’s role overseas while broadening the definition of security, as a function not just of freedom from terrorism but also of prosperity at home.

"As we end the war in Iraq and transition to Afghan responsibility, we must rebuild our strength here at home," Obama told an audience of West Point cadets on Dec. 1. "The nation that I am most interested in building is our own."

It is hard to think of a region that will benefit more from Obama’s prosperity-first approach than Latin America. Even Venezuela, Bolivia, Nicaragua and Ecuador – all members of the Bolivarian Alliance for the Americas, which was designed as an alternative to the U.S.-touted Free Trade Area of the Americas – all count the United States as their No. 1 trading partner. The potential for more constructive engagement between the U.S. and Latin America is much greater with this kind of alignment of interests. The rift is shrinking.

That said, it would be unrealistic for Latin America to expect instant, robust engagement from the United States. In his first 11 months in office, Obama has demonstrated a pragmatic approach to foreign policy. He does not aim to impose U.S. values abroad; his goal is to serve U.S. national interests and leave the policing of the world to others.

In the meantime, Latin-American leaders would do well to turn more pragmatic and shed their moralistic views of the situation in Honduras. They are fully aware that, in recent years, the gravest threat to democracy in the region was not its interruption, but rather the abuse of leaders’ power to fundamentally alter democratic order. Had something been done about the latter in Honduras, the former might have been avoided.

Senior officials in the Obama administration have indicated a willingness, as one put it, to "create stronger and better mechanisms for the collective defense of democracy in the Western Hemisphere." That may not sound as poetic as the lofty ambitions expressed by Obama’s predecessors. But if successful, such efforts would do more for Latin America than the previous unachieved goals that mostly reaped frustration.